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ABSTRACT
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are known to be vulnerable to
the maliciously generated adversarial examples. To detect these ad-
versarial examples, previous methods use artificially designed met-
rics to characterize the properties of adversarial subspaces where
adversarial examples lie. However, we find these methods are not
working in practical attack detection scenarios. Because the artifi-
cially defined features are lack of robustness and show limitation in
discriminative power to detect strong attacks. To solve this problem,
we propose a novel adversarial detection method which identifies
adversaries by adaptively learning reasonable metrics to character-
ize adversarial subspaces. As auxiliary context information, k near-
est neighbors are used to represent the surrounded subspace of the
detected sample. We propose an innovative model called Neighbor
Context Encoder (NCE) to learn from k neighbors context and infer
if the detected sample is normal or adversarial. We conduct thorough
experiment on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet dataset. The
results demonstrate that our approach surpasses all existing meth-
ods under three settings: attack-aware black-box detection, attack-
unaware black-box detection and white-box detection.
Index Terms— Adversarial examples, subspaces, attack detec-
tion
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been widely employed in a
large variety of applications such as image classification [1, 2],
speech recognition [3], and natural language processing [4]. How-
ever, recent works [5, 6] have found that DNNs are not robust
to adversarial examples: samples added with some imperceptible
perturbations but misleading a well trained model to output wrong
predictions. It arouses a great concern about the potential unsafety of
DNN applications [7, 8]. Thus, understanding and characterizing the
behavior of adversarial examples has become an imperative research
topic, as it helps to design better model protection mechanisms.
The existence of adversarial examples can be attributed to
some unavoidable regions in high dimensional representation space,
within which all the points have low probability and mislead the clas-
sifier to output some results totally contrary to human understanding.
These regions, also known as adversarial subspaces [9], have been
extensively studied in many previous works [10, 11, 12]. Aiming to
characterize adversarial regions, the earliest work [13] uses Kernel
Density (KD) as a measure since adversarial subspaces usually have
lower probability density. [10] follows up this work, they find KD
is not effective enough in more complicated situation, and propose
a more discriminative metric using Local Intrinsic Dimensionality
(LID) [14]. LID is based on classical expansion models theory [15]
and the hypothesis that the expansion dimensions of local adversar-
ial regions are often higher than normal regions. Instead of focusing
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Fig. 1: A failure case of adversarial detection methods of LID and
MDA, which demonstrates how false positive (FP) and false negative
(FN) samples appear. While our method can avoid the occurrence of
this successfully.
local subspaces, another kind of methods use the distance to each
class center of features to detect adversarial examples. [16] trains an
LSTM network on a sequence of such distance to find adversarial
examples. More recently, [17] does Mahalanobis Distance Analysis
(MDA) on adversarial example to each class conditional Gaussian
distributions estimated by Gaussian Discriminant Analysis (GDA).
MDA achieves the state of the art by improving baseline of the
adversarial detection with a big margin.
However, all existing detection methods featurize the adversar-
ial subspaces using artificially designed metrics merely. Despite el-
egant results have been achieved on some simple benchmarks, e.g.,
MNIST, we still find these metrics are weak and unstable under more
powerful attacks or more complex data distribution. Specially, Fig. 1
shows how LID [10] and MDA [17] fail to detect adversarial exam-
ples in disordered embedding space. Samples in red and green rep-
resent two different categories and the dash line indicates decision
boundary of the model. In the figure, the red triangle is a malicious
sample but still on the data manifold, while the green triangle is nor-
mal but seems far away from the sample distribution. Both LID and
MDA metrics confidently recall the green triangle as a adversarial
example, with letting the real adversary off. This case reveals that
even advanced LID and MDA metrics also have limitation in detec-
tion of more confusing adversaries.
In this paper, we propose a new idea that using a parameterized
model to adaptively learn deep features for detecting adversaries.
Different from existing methods which decoupled the adversarial de-
tection into two stages: artificially characterizing the samples and
classifying based on the obtained features, our method combines
the two stages into one end-to-end learning framework. Therefore,
our learned metric is more proper, and has stronger generalization
and representation power for classifying adversarial examples com-
pared with previous hand-designed metrics. Motivated by [13], we
uses the k nearest neighbors to quantify the surrounded subspace of
the detected sample. Generally, neighbors in the same subspace can
form a topology. Every node (neighbor) in topology has their own
attributes, and correlates to each other. If the surrounding neigh-
bor points are sufficiently dense, the properties of these topologies
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can also reflect the characters of subspaces in some respects. Based
on this recognition, we propose a novel Neighbor Context Encoder
(NCE). For a specified detected sample, NCE learns the feature from
the topology of its k nearest neighbors and infers if the detected sam-
ple is normal or adversarial. We borrow Transformer [4] to encode a
sequence of input neighbor points, which is ranked by their distance
to the detected sample in descending order. The attribute of each
neighbor point consists of three parts: 1) the distance to detected
sample; 2) the class label and 3) the position in input sequence, as
shown in Fig. 2. Then, the Transformer encoder effectively imitate
the relation among neighbors and detected samples, using multi-
head self attention. We conduct thorough experiment to analyze
the proposed method under three settings: attack-aware black-box
detection, attack-unaware black-box detection and white-box detec-
tion. The result shows that our method achieves state of the art de-
tecting FGSM [6], BIM [18], Deep-Fool [19] and C&W [20] attacks
on CIFAR-10 [21], CIFAR-100 [21] and ImageNet [22] datasets.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) We propose the first end-to-end learning framework for char-
acterizing adversarial subspaces, which greatly promote the tradi-
tional hand-designed descriptor in detection of adversarial examples.
(2) We propose a novel Neighbor Context Encoder (NCE) to
learns the feature of the subspaces formed by surrounded k nearest
neighbors.
(3) Extensive experiments illustrate that our method gains su-
perior performance on multi-attacks and generalizes well on other
more powerful attacks.
2. PROPOSED METHOD
We introduce our method and its detailed implementation in this sec-
tion. Our insight is parametrizing a DNN for learning to characterize
local adversarial regions. However, traditional neural networks fail
to process these region inputs because they lie in high dimensional
feature space and we cannot quantify them. Fortunately, motivated
by [13], which gives a hypothesis that adversarial regions can be
presented by locally surrounded nearest neighbors, we regard adver-
sarial subspace as a sequence of k nearest neighbors. The goal is to
predict the normality or abnormality of the detected sample based on
its surrounded adversarial subspace. We reformulate this problem as
a node/token prediction task, where detected sample is regarded as
predicted token, and its neighbors are viewed as contextual tokens.
Detailly, to predict an example being normal or adversarial, we first
search its k nearest neighbors in feature space. Every neighbor is
treated as a token and connects each other to form a sequence with
the length of k. Detected sample is added in the start position as a
special classification token ([CLS]). Then we use proposed NCE
to encode the input sequence and output the probability of predicted
sample (i.e.[CLS]token) being normal or adversarial. We note that
our method is different from [23], which augments neural networks
with a small detector subnetwork and learn to distinguish genuine
and adversarial data without considering the space characteristics.
General workflow and our model architecture are shown in Fig. 2.
2.1. Input preprocess
More details about how to construct the training data will be in-
troduced in this section. Suppose that we have a pre-trained tar-
get model H(x), which was not defended yet. Training images
Xcln are used for generating adversarial samples Xadv and noisy
samples Xnis. Here noisy examples are generated by adding ran-
dom noise to clean samples Xcln. Adding noisy images in training
Input image Feature
embedding K Nearest Neighbor Search
[CLS] NN1 NN2 NN3 NNk…Predicted token
Contextual tokens 
(k-nearest-neighbors)
Position 
Embeddings
Label 
Embeddings
Distance 
Embeddings
E[0] E[1] E[2] E[3] E[k]
[Zero] E[y1] E[y2] E[y3] E[yk]
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+ + + + +
+ + + + +
Ek is fixed positional 
encoding
E[yk] is the embedding 
of the label of k-th 
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Transformer T T T
…
…
Transformer T T T…
Output Probability Output the probability of the token being an clean or adversarial example  
E[CLS-NN1] E[CLS-NN2] E[CLS-NN3] E[CLS-NNk]
Fig. 2: The overall network architecture of NCE.
set as negative samples is a data augmentation trick first proposed
in [13, 24]. By feeding samples into model H(x), we get three
sets of l-th layer feature output
{
f lXcln , f
l
Xnis
, f lXadv
}
and corre-
sponding label {Ycln = 0, Ynis = 0, Yadv = 1}, where 0,1 present
negtive and positive samples respectively.
In addition to the training images, we also use a query-purpose
image library Xc = {xc1, xc2, ..., xcn} and its corresponding label
Y c ∈ {1, 2, .., C}, C is the number of classes. So that the training
images can query its k nearest neighbors from this database. Xc are
also fed into the model H(x) for obtaining the feature set f lXc ={
f lxc1 , f
l
xc2
, ..., f lxcn
}
. For each f lx ∈
{
f lXcln , f
l
Xnis
, f lXadv
}
, we
calculate the distance to the feature set f lXc and retrieve the nearest
k images as :
NN1,NN2, ...,NNk = topk([d(f
l
x, f
l
xc1
), d(f lx, f
l
xc2
),
..., d(f lx, f
l
xcn
)])
(1)
where topk(·) finds k samples in Xc with smallest distance, and
re-ranks them with descending order, then returns their indexes
NN1,NN2, ...,NNk. d(·) is a distance function, we use Euclidean
distance here. Query-purpose image library Xc provides contextual
information for classifying detected sample. It is remarkable that
Xc can be same as training images Xcln. We found the model
also achieved good performance when using Xcln as Xc directly in
experiment.
2.2. Learning to characterize adversarial subspaces
We borrow the idea of Transformer [4] to encode token represen-
tations. For a given token, its input representation is constructed
by summing the corresponding distance, label, and position embed-
dings. A visualization of this construction can be seen in Fig. 2.
Label embedding presents the label information of neighbors. We
assume the label of neighbors as ycNNi ∈ Y c, which is one-hot en-
coded. The learnable label embedding is created by embeddings
lookup:
E[yi] =W
T × ycNNi (2)
where W ∈ RC×D is embedding parameters, D is the embedding
size. Distance embedding presents the computed distance of neigh-
bor to the detected sample:
E[CLS−NNi] = d(f
l
x, f
l
xcNNi
) (3)
Since the distance is a scalar, we replicate it to the same dimension
size with the label embeddings. Position embedding injects some
information about the relative or absolute position of tokens in the
sequence position. We use sine and cosine functions of different
frequencies as fixed position embedding as in [4]:
E[i] = [sin(
i
t0
), cos(
i
t
1
D
), ..., ((D − 1) mod 2) cos( i
t
D−1
D
)] (4)
where t is the wavelengths parameter, here we set t = 10000. Fi-
nally, our input embedding sequence is the element-wise sum of
E[CLS−NNi], E[yi] and Ei:
E[NNi] = E[CLS−NNi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
distance emb
+ E[yi]︸︷︷︸
label emb
+ E[i]︸︷︷︸
position emb
(5)
For E[CLS] there is no label or distance embedding available, so we
use zero vectors instead. Subsequently, some Transformer layers
process the input and predict the probability of the[CLS]token be-
ing an normal or adversarial example:
p[CLS], p[NN1], p[NN2], ..., p[NNk] =
Transformers(E[CLS],E[NN1],E[NN2], ...,E[NNk])
(6)
where p[CLS], p[NN1], p[NN2], ..., p[NNk] is the output probabili-
ties of the Transformer corresponding to each input token. We
only use the prediction p[CLS] of[CLS]token in this case. Dur-
ing training, we use {Xcln, Xnis, Xadv} and corresponding labels
{Ycln = 0, Ynis = 0, Yadv = 1} to train the parameters of trans-
former layers and the label embeddings.
3. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we present the experimental results for detecting the
adversarial examples crafted on CIFAR-10 [21], CIFAR-100 and
large-scale ImageNet [22] visual recognition datasets. We compare
the detection capability of our method with two strong baseline:
LID [10] and MDA [17]. In the experiment, four attack methods:
FGSM [6], BIM [18], DeepFool [19] and C&W [20] are adopted as
adversaries.
Since the way to attack a model can be various under different
settings. We simulate three types of detection scenarios to test the
proposed method. i) the first and simplest scenario is attack-aware
black-box detection, in which we knows the attack scheme and can
use generated adversarial examples to train the detector. ii) another
situation is attack-unaware black-box detection. It is more practi-
cal since we usually have no information about what strategy the
attacker used. iii) the last and most difficult is white-box detection.
We assume that attacker knows the scheme and parameters of the de-
tector, and can design special methods to cheat the detection model.
3.1. Attack-aware black-box detection
In this case, we train ResNet [2], DenseNet [25] and ShuffleNet [26]
for classifying CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 images. And for larger
ImageNet benchmark, pretrained AlexNet and ResNet are em-
ployed. 10000 test images in CIFAR-10&100 and 10000 randomly
selected images in validation set of ImageNet (10 images per cate-
gory) are used as test datasets. To prevent the overlap, our detector
is trained and evaluated on test datasets. As suggested in [13, 24],
we augment noisy samples which add random Gaussian noise on
clean images as negative training data. For the Transformer, we
set the dimension size of both label and position embedding as 16.
Since the distance is a continuous number, we replicate it to the
same dimension size with the label and position embedding. In the
experiment, we use multi-layer output as features and search the
k nearest neighbors based on the feature of each layer. Then we
concatenate the embeddings computed by Eq. 5 on each layer as the
input. The designed detection network is relatively small because
we find that greater capacity does not help for the efficiency. We
only use 1 Transformer encode layer, which contains a multi-head
self attention layer with head number of 8, and subsequently 2 fc
layers with Dropout [27] of 0.1 probability.
Results are presented in Table 1. we report the area under the
receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) score as the metric
for performance. Both two baseline methods have achieved high
detection accuracy and AUROC score on gradient-based attacks
(FGSM and BIM). Among them LID has worse performance be-
cause the feature of LID may not be discriminative enough in more
complex and difficult adversarial detection tasks. Instead of calcu-
lating LID, MDA uses more robust mahalanobis distance as feature
and get better AUROC score. Although those artificially defined
features achieve great performance in detection of gradient-based
attacks, for optimization-based attaks, they are weak and unstable.
While our learned representations are effective in recall hard sam-
ples in detection tasks. It has higher AUROC on both four tested
attacks. For CW attacker, we greatly promote the detection perfor-
mance on CIFAR-10&100 datasets, but on ImageNet, both MDA
and our approach have lower AUROC because of the confusion
among classes caused by a large number of categories.
3.2. Attack-unaware black-box detection
As suggested in [10], for evaluating whether the model tuned on a
simple attack can be generalized to detect other attacks, we give a
generalization analysis. Here, we go a step further to test the de-
tection ability on transfer attacks [28], e.g., performing attack on
surrogate model and replaying it to the target model. ResNet and
ShuffleNet trained on CIFAR10 dataset are used for detection gener-
alizability test. As shown in Table 2, head of the row means training
attacks and head of the column means testing attacks. For example,
in third row first column of the table, 67.36% presents the AUROC
score when the LID detector is trained using seen FGSM attack on
ShuffleNet and tested using unseen DeepFool attack on ResNet. The
results demonstrate that both LID and MDA are not good at detecting
unseen attacks in most cases. For instance, LID and MDA detector
trained using BIM attack on ShuffleNet only get around 50% AU-
ROC score, which is equivalent to a random predictor. It implies
that LID and MDA can only capture the characteristics of the seen
attack, but not the characteristics of the common adversarial sub-
space. The main reason is that LID and MDA score may vary greatly
on different attacks, which cause significant decline in classification.
Instead, our approach gains huge improvement compared with the
existing methods. Specifically, it can enhance the baseline of detect-
ing C&W attack on ShuffleNet from 67.15% to 84.31% when model
is trained using BIM attack on ResNet. Our model learns similar
representation for different types of attacks, but varies greatly only
between normal and adversarial examples. Thus, adversarial sub-
space can be characterized more exactly using our approach.
Table 1: Comparison of attack-aware black-box detection performance using AUROC(%) score. The best results are indicated in bold.
Dataset Model FGSM(AUROC(%)) BIM(AUROC(%)) DeepFool(AUROC(%)) CW(AUROC(%))LID MDA Ours LID MDA Ours LID MDA Ours LID MDA Ours
CIFAR10
ShuffleNet 93.65 99.36 99.73 98.02 98.68 98.74 79.24 67.26 84.94 72.64 62.16 82.89
ResNet 99.41 99.93 99.95 95.79 99.55 99.62 91.01 94.73 94.97 88.76 97.36 97.57
DenseNet 99.86 99.94 99.97 99.64 99.90 99.87 99.64 99.82 99.89 85.55 88.07 94.41
CIFAR100
ShuffleNet 92.57 99.30 99.83 92.37 96.92 97.62 66.37 73.35 84.35 61.71 69.77 80.39
ResNet 98.77 99.77 99.93 96.11 97.07 98.68 68.81 88.05 88.69 75.62 94.11 96.65
DenseNet 97.99 99.71 99.91 99.25 99.78 99.82 70.34 74.25 82.88 71.29 80.99 90.84
ImageNet ResNet 92.96 98.21 99.55 93.33 97.82 99.56 96.45 96.56 97.86 72.30 64.97 63.79AlexNet 96.07 98.63 98.82 93.77 96.60 98.54 97.60 97.65 98.03 63.74 61.52 63.90
Table 2: Comparison of AUROC(%) under attack-unaware black-box detection setting. The best results are indicated in bold.
ResNet ShuffleNet
DeepFool CW DeepFool CW
LID MDA Ours LID MDA Ours LID MDA Ours LID MDA Ours
ResNet FGSM 72.45 78.90 88.70 84.59 95.22 84.50 71.47 73.27 84.87 65.23 72.65 86.72BIM 83.98 88.72 88.81 78.86 93.72 94.60 57.76 63.26 80.58 52.77 67.15 84.31
ShuffleNet FGSM 67.36 68.10 87.99 65.50 64.34 74.76 63.70 64.39 72.61 58.52 50.64 66.16BIM 50.01 54.75 65.13 50.17 50.05 58.84 53.89 55.84 63.14 47.20 55.71 61.87
3.3. White-box detection
Many adversarial detection methods are proved to be ineffective un-
der adaptive attack. [24] incorporates kernel density into the adver-
sarial objective and makes detection more difficult for the KD-based
method. Similarly, we also combine LID and MDA as one of the
optimizing objectives and fool the detector successfully. The funda-
mental cause of such detectors being vulnerable to adaptive attack
is that they are differentiable. On the contrary, our model receives
discrete sample point as input, which makes adaptive attack more
difficult. Since it is hard to find an gradient-based adaptative at-
tacker based on our method, we use the direction to a selected target
sample to approximate the gradient, as in [29]. We choose a nearest
clean sample in Xcln with different label as a target sample. The
goal is moving the generated adversarial example closer to target
sample in embedding space. In white-box case, we found only 16%
of these adversaries bypass our model, which shows good robustness
on white-box attacks. We also conduct the same attack on LID and
MDA, the fooling rate is up to 72% and 80% respectively.
3.4. Ablation study
In the experiment, we found hyperparameters k and D playing an
important role. We analyze how they affect the performance of
model in Fig. 3. We draw the performance curve of AUROC(%) cor-
responding different choices of nearest neighbor number k and input
embedding size D. In left-hand part, the AUROC score increases
gradually with inputing more nearest neighbors. And we found the
performance remaining unchanged when k increases to 50. The per-
formance draw of different input embedding size D also have the
same trend. It reaches the maximum peak when input embedding
size equals to 16. This phenomenon shows that large embedding
size or redundant neighbors are not helpful but confusing the detec-
tion of adversarial examples. So we set k = 50 and D = 16 as the
empirical value in the experiments.
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Fig. 3: Performance plot of different choices of nearest neighbor
number k and input embedding size D.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the problem of characterizing the proper-
ties of adversarial regions to detect adversarial examples. We use a
parametrizd DNN named Neighbor Context Encoder (NCE) to adap-
tively learn reasonable metrics in characterization of adversarial sub-
spaces. The experimental results suggest our method is effective in
detection of four classic adversaries: FGSM, BIM, Deep-Fool and
C&W. It exceeds all the existing adversarial detection methods in
both accuracy and generalization ability. Besides, our method is the
first simple solution of using parametrizd model to learn features of
the adversarial subspace. We think there will be many potential fu-
ture works in this direction.
In the training stage, our model only accepts the sequence of k
nearest neighbors, where each neighbor are presented as the feature
of each layer. It does not care the feature evolution throughout the
forward pass in the model. Learning the correlation of the internal
features is a future work.
Another future direction is designing a strong attacker against
our nondifferentiable model. An adaptative attacker also helps to
build robust detection models.
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